Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Laura Symczyk, No. 11-1059, — S.Ct. –, 2013 WL 1567370 (Apr. 16, 2013)
The U.S. Supreme Court’s (“Supreme Court”) ruling in Genesis, didn’t address the ultimate question of whether an unaccepted offer to make the named plaintiff whole can moot the individual Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) claim. However, in a 5-4 decision, the majority assumed that an unaccepted offer mooted the individual FLSA claim and, therefore, held that the collective action could not proceed. As the Dissent points out, by failing to consider the ultimate question of whether an unaccepted offer can moot the individual claim, the majority’s opinion in this case will “aid no one, now or ever.”
The facts of Genesis are as follows: the plaintiff was a former employee of the defendants. The plaintiff filed a collective action complaint alleging that the defendants violated the FLSA by automatically deducting 30 minutes of time worked per shift for meal breaks for certain employees, even when the employees performed compensable work during those breaks. When the defendants filed their answer they simultaneously served an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (“Rule 68”). The Rule 68 offer included $7,500 for the alleged unpaid wages and stated that if the plaintiff did not accept the offer within 10 days, the offer would be withdrawn. The plaintiff failed to respond to the offer within 10 day period thus the offer was withdrawn. The defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing that because they offered the plaintiff complete relief for her individual claim for damages, she no longer had a personal stake in the outcome of the collective action, rendering it moot. The plaintiff objected and argued that the defendants were attempting to “pick off” the named plaintiff before the collective action process could unfold.
The District Court based their ruling to dismiss the case on the facts that no other employee joined the lawsuit and that the Rule 68 offer of judgment fully satisfied her individual claim, thereby mooting the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff’s individual claim was moot based on prior case-law within the circuit that states whether or not a Rule 68 offer is accepted, it generally moots the claim. Also, no other potential plaintiff opted into the lawsuit and the offer fully satisfied the plaintiff’s claim. However, the Court of Appeals found that the collective action was not moot because some defendants may attempt to “pick off” the named plaintiffs with Rule 68 offers before certification. This could frustrate the goals of collective actions.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court did not resolve the split in the Third Circuit regarding whether an unaccepted offer that fully satisfies a plaintiff’s individual FLSA claim is sufficient to render that claim moot because this issue was not properly before the court. Even the United States, through amicus curiae, urged the Supreme Court to hold that an unaccepted offer does not moot a FLSA claim. Since the plaintiff conceded this issue in the lower courts and failed to properly raise this issue in her brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that an unaccepted Rule 68 offer moots a plaintiff’s individual FLSA claim. The issue the Supreme Court did decide on was whether a court could proceed with the proposed collective action when an unaccepted settlement offer mooted the named plaintiff’s individual FLSA claim. Since no other employee opted into the case and the named plaintiff’s individual claim was moot, the majority held that the collective-action also became moot because the named plaintiff lacked any personal interest in representing others in the lawsuit. The majority rejected the plaintiff’s arguments which were based on two prior cases involving Rule 23 class actions. The majority stated that Rule 23 class actions are fundamentally different from collective actions under the FLSA and the cases cited by plaintiff were inapplicable to the present facts.
The Dissent felt the majority opinion failed to address the most important issue of whether an unaccepted offer can render a plaintiff’s individual FLSA claim moot. The Dissent states that the situation addressed in the majority opinion “should never again arise.” The dissenting opinion gives a thorough analysis regarding this issue and decides that an unaccepted offer should not render a plaintiff’s individual claim moot, especially when, as in this case, the named plaintiff was not awarded any damages or other relief. The Dissent cites case law to support their view: “[A] case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. –, — (2012). When the named plaintiff in Genesis rejected the Rule 68 offer by not replying within the 10 day period, her claims remained intact and “so too does the court’s ability to grant her relief.” The Dissent compared the unaccepted settlement offer to an unaccepted contract offer; both are “a legal nullity, with no operative effect.” Moreover, the Dissent looked to Rule 68 itself to see if this basic principle held true. The rule states that “[a]n unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn.” FRCP 68(b). Rule 68 also prevents a court from “imposing judgment for a plaintiff…based on an unaccepted settlement offer made pursuant to its terms.” Furthermore, Rule 68 “contemplates that a court will enter judgment only when a plaintiff accepts an offer.” Only in the most egregious situations can a court use its discretion to enter judgment for the plaintiff.
The Dissent demanded the Third Circuit to, “Rethink [their] mootness-by-unaccepted-offer theory,” and proclaimed, albeit sarcastically, to all other courts of appeals, “Don’t try this at home.” Nothing the Dissent states in their opinion contradicts the majority because the majority erroneously failed to consider this crucial issue. “The majority’s decision is fit for nothing: Aside from getting this case wrong, it serves only to address a make-believe problem.”